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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Defined as “[a] court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process [by 
asserting] jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal rights, rather than merely over 
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property interests,”1 personal jurisdiction, or “in personam” jurisdiction, and its 
broadly interpreted principles have consistently proven to be a muddy field for 
courts within the United States.  Even more complicated is the application of these 
principles to foreign defendants.  From the mid-nineteenth century decision in 
Pennoyer v. Neff2 to the more recent International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 
defendants have been subject to a variety of tests and criteria for determining the 
most critical of questions in a judicial dispute: where can I be required to litigate?   
An inquiry into current personal jurisdiction case law results in a fairly 
standardized procedure for establishing a forum within the U.S. in contract disputes.  
Forum selection clauses, while occasionally held to be unconscionable, have proven 
useful in a variety of industries.
4
  Additionally, modern tests determining whether 
sufficient “minimum contacts” exist with a particular state have invariably been 
upheld as authoritative.
5
  While the involvement of corporations as parties to a suit 
                                                          
† J.D. Candidate, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Class of 
2012.  The author wishes to thank her family and friends for their unwavering support, and 
Professor Susan J. Becker for her essential guidance and encouragement throughout the 
writing process. 
 1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (8th ed. 2005). 
 2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 3 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 4 There are several methods for determining the enforceability of forum selection clauses, 
though the Federal District Court in Rhode Island has instituted a nine-factor test for assessing 
reasonableness:  
1. The identity of the law which governs the construction of the contract; 
2. The place of execution of the contract(s); 
3. The place where the transactions have been or are to be performed; 
4. The availability of remedies in the designated forum; 
5. The public policy of the initial forum state;  
6. The location of the parties, the convenience of prospective witnesses, and the 
accessibility of evidence; 
7. The relative bargaining power of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their 
dealings; 
8. The presence or absence of fraud, undue influence or other extenuating (or exacerbating) 
circumstances; and 
9. The conduct of the parties. 
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, at 712 (D.R.I. 1983). 
For the purposes of this paper, those situations in which forums selection clauses apply to e-
commerce transactions are not considered.  This paper focuses instead on contractual 
situations where forum selection clauses did not exist in the agreement or were held to be 
unconscionable. 
 5 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  See infra p. 6 (explanation of the “minimum 
contacts” test). 
2011] INTERNET CONTRACTING AND E-COMMERCE 97 
 
instead of individuals leaves an arbiter with a slightly more varied array of 
outcomes, forum selection may eventually be settled using “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”6  Most importantly, states have adopted long-arm 
statutes, allowing courts to acquire jurisdiction over anyone who conducts business 
within that state.  Federal procedures for assessing personal jurisdiction also rely 
heavily upon these state statutes. 
In cases involving international defendants, a variety of bases have been deemed 
appropriate for a U.S. court to assert personal jurisdiction, including nationality,
7
 
domicile,
8
 “purposeful availment,”9 and a number of federal statutes.10   
With the explosion of the Internet and the resulting expansion of international 
business transactions via the Web, courts have struggled to adapt traditional modes 
of adjudication consistent with established common, statutory and international law.  
Internet transactions—now known as e-commerce—involve the “practice of buying 
and selling goods and services through online consumer services on the Internet.”11  
In a sphere of commerce apparently limitless in its reach, this article explores the 
modern abyss of personal jurisdiction in e-commerce disputes.  An analysis leads to 
the following proposal: the U.S. should adopt a federal long-arm statute that includes 
an e-commerce provision, allowing courts to effectively and systematically evaluate 
the propriety of personal jurisdiction in Internet commerce disputes.  The new statute 
would apply in international cases between the U.S. and its contracting partner states 
to bolster the effectiveness of the long-arm statute provisions on personal 
jurisdiction in e-commerce. 
To reach this conclusion, an analysis of modern personal jurisdiction is 
necessary.  Section II of this article provides a history of personal jurisdiction in 
contract cases within the U.S. and outside its boundaries, including traditional 
methods for resolving disputes and the status of current state long-arm statutes.  
Section II also addresses issues of cyberspace, including common forms of Internet 
contracting and the resulting discord arising out of a lack of uniform treatment 
among e-commerce disputes.  Finally, this section takes into account previously 
published scholarly opinions on the subject of e-commerce and personal jurisdiction.  
                                                          
 6 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  “Traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice” is more clearly explained in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws: 
“No rule will be adopted initially unless it is in accord with contemporary views of what is fair 
and just. So, subject to exceptions stemming from the third factor to be mentioned, a state will 
lack jurisdiction to try a case in its courts if the advantages which trial in the state would 
afford one party are greatly outweighed by the hardship and inconvenience which would be 
suffered by the other.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1988). 
 7 See infra note 63 for a discussion of nationality. 
 8 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (holding that “[d]omicile in [a] state is 
alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for 
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”).  See also 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §11(1) (1988) (“Domicile is a place, 
usually a person's home, to which the rules of Conflict of Laws sometimes accord 
determinative significance because of the person's identification with that place.”). 
 9 See infra p.11 for a discussion of purposeful availment. 
 10 See infra note 87 for a discussion of federal statutes. 
 11 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 434 (8th ed. 2005). 
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In examining these various proposals for a remodeled system, the ultimate 
conclusion reached is that acceptance of a newly formulated federal long-arm statute 
and its further application to e-commerce disputes provides the most effective way to 
resolve this highly complicated problem.  Therefore, Section III offers an argument 
for the adoption of a federal long-arm statute, providing a model statute, explaining 
its terminology, and showing its international significance.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
United States courts generally categorize judicial jurisdiction in three ways: those 
circumstances in which power is asserted based on an individual's person or assets 
(in personam, or personal jurisdiction), those looking to previous claims of interest 
in specific pieces of property (in rem jurisdiction), or occasions in which an 
individual attempts to take property as collateral for a pending, unrelated claim 
involving the owner of that property (quasi in rem jurisdiction).12  Though any of 
these three jurisdictional bases may apply in a given business context, this paper 
focuses on personal jurisdiction as it relates to the adjudication of contractual 
relationships made internationally through e-commerce. 
In the realm of e-commerce, there are two basic contractual forms: business-to-
business and business-to-consumer.13 Business-to-business contracts include 
vertically and horizontally integrated markets with businesses buying from and 
selling to each other.14  Business-to-consumer contracts, on the other hand, involve 
the seller of a good or service bringing the contracted thing directly to the consumer, 
each deriving benefit from the transaction through an exchange of goods or services 
and money.15 
For the purposes of this paper, a focus on business-to-consumer contracts will be 
most constructive, this being the relationship that leads to litigation more often than 
associations between two businesses.  To give this concept weight, especially in the 
sphere of international business, consider the following scenario: Seller (S) 
manufactures widgets in his home country of France and advertises them globally 
through ads circulating various websites.  Buyer (B), an individual living in the U.S., 
is interested in purchasing some of these widgets.  Through an electronic agreement 
(meaning a contract conducted over the Internet, accompanied by party’s electronic 
signature16), B contracts to buy several widgets.  However, when they arrive, they 
are defective and do not suit B’s intended purpose.  The question is, may B 
successfully bring S to court in the U.S. to recover his losses?  Do factors such as S’s 
advertising strategy through the Web affect the outcome?  This paper helps to 
answer these questions, describing the standards involved in adjudicating with 
foreign defendants where personal jurisdiction over the defendant is made 
appropriate by the formation of an e-commerce relationship.    
                                                          
 12 See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 28 (2d ed. 1994). 
 13 E-COMMERCE LAW & BUSINESS § 1.02[A], at 1-5 (Mark E. Plotkin, ed. 2003). 
 14 See id. § 1.02[A][1], at 1-5. 
 15 See id. § 1.02[A][2], at 1-9. 
 16 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN), Pub. L. No. 106-
229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.). 
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To accurately depict the way in which current personal jurisdiction in the U.S. 
evolved—domestically and internationally—a historical account of this area of law 
is necessary.   
A.  The Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction in the United States 
Traditionally, a court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction in the U.S. required the 
physical presence of the defendant to a suit in the forum state.
17
  This geography-
bound prerequisite became impractical with the expansion of interstate commerce in 
the early Twentieth Century, forcing courts to consider cases in which contractual 
parties were not invariably immediate neighbors.  Courts allowed a substantial 
degree of physical separation between parties, while attempting to safeguard a 
defendant's rights.  The resulting personal jurisdiction standards placed greater 
emphasis on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution,
18
 but no longer required a defendant to be physically present 
within a jurisdiction for personal jurisdiction to be appropriate.
19
 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1945, significantly changed personal jurisdiction law.
20
  International Shoe involved 
a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.
21
  
Though the company did not have any offices or make sales contracts in the state of 
Washington, several of the companies’ salesmen resided there.22  The state of 
Washington brought suit against International Shoe in state court, arguing that the 
company had made itself amenable to Washington courts by selling shoes there but 
failing to contribute to the state unemployment compensation fund.
23
  International 
Shoe argued that Washington courts lacked jurisdiction over the company and its 
salesmen because its activities within that state were insufficient to constitute a 
“presence” there.24  In resolving this dispute, the Supreme Court announced the 
introduction of the “minimum contacts” test, stating that:  
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
                                                          
 17 See generally Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720.  As illustrated in this seminal case, Nineteenth 
Century courts believed that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the 
territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”  Id.  
 18 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 19 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Jurisdiction in these 
circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the 
forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's 
affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an 
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted 
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for 
physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.”). 
 20 See generally International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 21 Id. at 313-14. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. at 314-15. 
 24 Id. at 315. 
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forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’25   
The court reasoned that, if the defendant enjoyed protections afforded by the laws of 
a particular state during the course of business, and especially if the defendant was 
able to manipulate the laws of that state to further the defendant's own contractual 
rights, the state had the prerogative to execute its laws against that individual.
26
  In 
this case, because International Shoe had rendered itself amenable to the Washington 
courts because of the activities of its salesmen in that State, personal jurisdiction 
over it was proper.27  As a result of the International Shoe decision, courts find that 
adjudicatory proceedings subjecting an out-of-state defendant to a particular state's 
laws comply with due process considerations where that defendant has had 
systematic and continuous contacts with a forum state.
28
   This test, however, did not 
impart a bright-line application. 
The 1980s also brought greater illumination to those still shadowy corners of 
personal jurisdiction by asking courts to consider whether a defendant has contacts 
and conducted themselves in such a way as to “reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court” in the forum state.29  In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the 
Robinsons, a family that bought a car from a New York car retailer, were driving 
through Oklahoma when their car was struck, resulting in severe injuries to several 
family members.
30
  The Robinsons brought a products-liability suit in an Oklahoma 
court against the New York retailer, the importer of the car, and the car’s 
manufacturer, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
31
  The defendant retailer argued that 
because it did not have minimum contacts with the state of Oklahoma, being forced 
to litigate there violated its due process rights.
32
   The Supreme Court reasoned that 
if personal jurisdiction were to be asserted on the basis of minimum contacts, it 
should also consider a defendant's objective knowledge of the terms of the contract 
he or she signs.
33
  In doing so, potential defendants would be more cognizant as to 
whether they might be held liable in a particular jurisdiction.  By looking to the 
nature and frequency of his or her contact with a state, a party to a contract can more 
aptly predict whether the laws of that state apply to them, and are thus given fair 
warning of the potential for a lawsuit and assured of all necessary due process 
rights.
34
  In this instance, because there was no evidence that any other cars sold by 
                                                          
 25 Id. at 316. 
 26 See id.  
 27 See id. at 321. 
 28 See id. at 320. 
 29 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 30 Id. at 495-96. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id.  
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the retailer ever entered Oklahoma, the Court agreed that assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over the retailer violated its due process rights.   
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz further clarified this standard of review.
35
  In 
this case, the defendants opened a Burger King franchise in their home state of 
Michigan, the contracts establishing the franchise providing that the laws of the 
home state of Burger King, Florida, would govern.36  Burger King eventually chose 
to terminate the franchise when business slowed, but the defendants refused to close 
the restaurant.37  Burger King brought an action against the defendants in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging breach of franchise 
obligations.38  The Supreme Court held that assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendants pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute was valid.39  Here, the 
defendants had derived substantial benefits from their association with a major 
national restaurant chain and, moreover, that the defendants had voluntarily entered 
into a “long-term and exacting regulation” of their business from Burger King’s 
headquarters in Florida.40  Since the defendants had established such a substantial 
and continuing relationship with that Corporation’s offices, and because the 
franchise contract presumed that litigation in Florida was probable, the Court held 
that the defendants’ due process rights were not infringed by being forced to litigate 
there.41   
In deciding Burger King, the Court explained that “it is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”42  Consequently, a defendant cannot be forced to litigate in a 
state where the defendant only had random or attenuated contacts.
43
  Only where the 
defendant has contacts with the forum state that “proximately result” from actions of 
the defendant is personal jurisdiction proper.
44
   
With evolutions in the status of personal jurisdiction, courts have been given 
more specific, but still highly elastic, standards by which to analyze forum selection 
within the U.S.  Still, almost nothing has proved more valuable than the introduction 
of long-arm statutes, which continue the tradition of considering “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”45  This legal creation is, more often than not, the 
basis for a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction today. 
                                                          
 35 See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 465-66.  
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. at 468. 
 38 Id. at 468–69. 
 39 Id. at 487. 
 40 Id. at 479-488. 
 41 See id. at 487. 
 42 Id. at 475. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. 
 45 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
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B.  State Long-Arm Statutes: The Bedrock for Improvement 
State long-arm statutes are enacted by individual states to define instances in 
which the state court may assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.
46
  
These statutes create a presumption that assertion of personal jurisdiction is 
appropriate, though due process analyses are still necessary on a case-by-base basis 
to protect the Constitutional rights of defendants.  The first state long-arm statute 
was adopted by Illinois in 1955, following International Shoe, and by 1963 each of 
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had 
adopted some method for asserting jurisdiction over nonresidents.
47
   
                                                          
 46 See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 4-3 (1983).  Because Congress 
has not enacted a federal version of the state long-arm statute, Rule Four of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure enables federal courts to borrow long-arm statutes of the states in which 
federal courts are located: “[u]nless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than 
a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a 
judicial district of the United States by: (1) following state law for serving a summons in an 
action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 
where service is made.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1).  See infra pp. 21-25 for an argument as to 
why a federal long-arm statute should be adopted. 
 47 CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-3.  In addition to several states adopting their own statutes, 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted a model state long-arm statute under the 
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act in 1963.  Id.  This statue, similar to the one 
I propose in its breadth, reads as follows:      
§ 1.02. [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Enduring Relationship]. 
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized 
under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this state as 
to any [cause of action] [claim for relief]. 
§ 1.03. [Personal Jurisdiction Based on Conduct]. 
1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an 
agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's 
a) transacting any business in this state; 
b) contracting to supply services or things in this state; 
c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
d) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he 
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered, in this state; [or] 
e) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state ; [or] 
f) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the 
time of contracting]. 
2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a [cause of action] 
[claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against 
him. 
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1.  Types of Long-Arm Statutes  
There are three basic approaches to state long-arm statutes.  The first, adopted by 
states such as California and Nevada, are simple and broad.48  They provide for the 
power to assert jurisdiction over an individual or corporation so long as that 
jurisdiction meets due process requirements.
49
  The second type usually provides a 
brief enumerated list of those situations likely to satisfy the “minimum contacts” 
test.  Texas and New York have adopted this form, covering basic business 
transactions and tortious conduct involving defendants that may result in litigation 
with nonresidents.
50
  The final type of long-arm statute lists, in detail, the situations 
                                                          
 48 CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-6.  See generally Long-Arm Statutes: A Fifty State Survey, 
VEDDER PRICE (2003), http://www.vedderprice.com/docs/pub/64a3d50f-1bf1-4b7d-a238-
6b76933afa53_document.pdf.  Other states that provide this basic form of long-arm statutes 
include Wyoming and Rhode Island.  Id.   
 49 Id. As an example of this statutory form, California’s long-arm statute reads as follows: 
“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the 
Constitution of this state or of the United States.”  CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (2011). 
 50  CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-4.  See generally Long-Arm Statutes, supra note 48.  States 
that follow long-arm statutes like that found in New York include: Connecticut, Georgia, 
Minnesota, and New Hampshire.  Id.   
As an example of this statutory form, New York’s long-arm statute reads as follows: 
§ 302.  Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries 
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any 
of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through 
an agent: 
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply 
goods or services in the state; or 
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act; or 
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or 
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of 
character arising from the act, if he 
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from 
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or 
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have 
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from 
interstate or international commerce; or 
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state. 
(b) Personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in matrimonial actions or 
family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial action or family court 
proceeding involving a demand for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive 
awards or special relief in matrimonial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the respondent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is 
a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if 
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in which a state court may assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.  
These statutes, such as the ones found in Ohio and Kentucky, list various forms of 
business transactions, tortious conduct, usage of personal property, and similar 
activity by a defendant that may result in a lawsuit over which the state has 
jurisdiction.
51
 
                                                          
the party seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such 
demand is made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties 
before their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the 
claim for support, alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in 
matrimonial actions accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement 
executed in this state. The family court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
non-resident respondent to the extent provided in sections one hundred fifty-four 
and one thousand thirty-six and article five-B of the family court act and article five-
A of the domestic relations law. 
(c) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this 
section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of 
action not arising from an act enumerated in this section. 
(d) Foreign defamation judgment. The courts of this state shall have personal 
jurisdiction over any person who obtains a judgment in a defamation proceeding 
outside the United States against any person who is a resident of New York or is a 
person or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York who has assets in New York 
or may have to take actions in New York to comply with the judgment, for the 
purposes of rendering declaratory relief with respect to that person's liability for the 
judgment, and/or for the purpose of determining whether said judgment should be 
deemed non-recognizable pursuant to section fifty-three hundred four of this 
chapter, to the fullest extent permitted by the United States constitution, provided: 
1. the publication at issue was published in New York, and 
2. that resident or person amenable to jurisdiction in New York (i) has 
assets in New York which might be used to satisfy the foreign defamation 
judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions in New York to comply with 
the foreign defamation judgment. The provisions of this subdivision shall 
apply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation proceedings 
outside the United States prior to and/or after the effective date of this 
subdivision. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R., § 302 (McKinney 2011). 
 51 CASAD, supra note 46, at 4-4.  See generally Long-Arm Statutes, supra note 48.  Those 
states that adopted a lengthy enumerated list include: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.  Id. 
As an example of this statutory form, Ohio’s long-arm statute reads as follows: 
§ 2307.382. Personal jurisdiction  
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by 
an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's: 
   (1) Transacting any business in this state; 
   (2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
   (3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
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2.  Due Process Considerations 
Because state long-arm statutes have the capability of compelling almost any 
individual to litigate in a state if the state court deems its jurisdiction proper, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognizes the importance of due process rights in the application of 
the statutes.
52
  Two types of personal jurisdiction exist in the United States: general 
and specific.
53
  General personal jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any claim 
against a defendant where the defendant has had a sufficient degree of continuous 
                                                          
   (4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if 
he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered in this state; 
   (5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or 
impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably 
have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, 
provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered in this state; 
   (6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state 
committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have 
expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state; 
   (7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of which 
takes place in this state, which he commits or in the commission of which he is 
guilty of complicity. 
   (8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; 
   (9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at 
the time of contracting. 
(B) For purposes of this section, a person who enters into an agreement, as a 
principal, with a sales representative for the solicitation of orders in this state is 
transacting business in this state. As used in this division, "principal" and "sales 
representative" have the same meanings as in section 1335.11 of the Revised Code. 
(C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause 
of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (2011). 
 52  See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-1163 (1966) (describing 
situations in which assertion of personal jurisdiction (specific and general) may place undue 
burden on defendants) [hereinafter von Mehren]. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that a Texas court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation because a representative of the corporation did not have 
sufficient continuous and systematic contacts to satisfy due process requirements); Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that a state court has authority to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that person committed intentional, tortious acts 
aimed directly at the forum state). 
 53 See von Mehren, supra note 52, at 1136.   
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and systematic contacts with the forum state.
54
  Once this type of jurisdiction has 
been established, that court may hear any claim against the defendant, whether or not 
it is related to the action that has arisen out of the forum state.
55
  Specific personal 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, only permits adjudication of claims that are related to 
or arise out of a defendant's contacts with the forum state.   
Differentiating between “general” or “specific” jurisdiction provides an 
additional safeguard in protecting a defendant's due process rights, limiting the 
extent to which a state court may litigate a matter.  In distinguishing the nature of a 
claim in this way, the hope is that the defendant will not be unduly burdened by 
being haled into a forum state with which he or she has not had sufficient contact.  
Specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper where the contract in 
dispute had a “substantial connection” with the forum state,56 while assertion of 
general personal jurisdiction requires a showing that there were continuous and 
systematic contacts with the forum state.
57
  Looking at claims in this way is a crucial 
aspect of providing fair proceedings, especially when the source and effects of a 
particular action are difficult to pinpoint, as in e-commerce transactions.  
Regardless of whether the personal jurisdiction is specific or general, a defendant 
must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state,58 indicating that the 
defendant could reasonably expect to be “haled into court” in that state59 and it must 
be shown that adjudication against the defendant in that forum does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”60 
C.  International Personal Jurisdiction  
The previously discussed standards for asserting personal jurisdiction over 
defendants in litigation between U.S. citizens also apply to cases in which a U.S. 
court attempts to assert personal jurisdiction over an international defendant.  
Notwithstanding variations in form, the basic concept is the same: assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant cannot violate due process requirements of 
the U.S. Constitution, nor violate current international treaties.61  Distinguishing 
between general and specific personal jurisdiction is a critical part of the analysis in 
such cases.
62
   
                                                          
 54 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.  See generally Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was appropriate 
where the defendant Mining Company continuous and systematic contacts with the forum 
state in the form of business meetings, payment of salaries, and stock transfers). 
 55 See BORN, supra note 12, at 34. 
 56 von Mehren, supra note 52, at 1149-50. 
 57 See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION § 4.09 (1988).  See 
generally Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783. 
 58 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 59 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 60 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 61 See generally BORN, supra note 12, at 35. 
 62 See generally BORN, supra note 12, at 35-95. 
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1.  General Personal Jurisdiction 
To assert general personal jurisdiction over an international defendant and 
successfully litigate a dispute with a foreign defendant, the U.S. court must prove 
that it has jurisdiction based on one of three broad categories: (1) that the 
individual’s nationality,63 domicile,64 residence,65 or, if a business, its incorporation 
status,
66
 exposed the foreign defendant to the laws of the U.S.; (2) that the defendant 
had continuous and systematic activities within the forum such that it is subject to 
litigation in the U.S.;
67
 or (3) that the “transitory presence” of the defendant within 
the forum makes personal jurisdiction possible.
68
  
There are obvious benefits and detriments that arise out of the use of these 
criteria as a basis for general personal jurisdiction.  For example, though these 
conditions were put into place to make litigation procedures with foreign defendants 
more efficient and fair, it is quite possible that even a U.S. citizen residing in a 
foreign nation might complain that being forced to adjudicate within the U.S. is 
burdensome, requiring extensive travel and expense.
69
  Corporations that have been 
obliged to litigate in a U.S. forum commonly argue that contracting in an open 
market makes the corporation liable to litigation virtually anywhere its goods are to 
                                                          
 63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§421(2)(d) (stating that “a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person 
or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted . . . the person, if a natural person, 
is a national of the state”).  See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (holding 
that a nation such as the United States could require one of its citizens, who was then traveling 
in France, to return to it to be charged or to litigate a claim because he was a national of the 
U.S.). 
 64 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 65 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971).  Comment (a) 
provides factors to be considered in determining whether jurisdiction based on residency is 
proper, including “(1) the amount of time the individual spends in the state, (2) the nature of 
his place of abode in the state, (3) his attitude of mind toward the state, as for example, 
whether he regards it with affection and as a place to which he likes to go whenever possible, 
and (4) the things he does in the state.”  Id.    
Residency as a basis for personal jurisdiction can be particularly problematic in an 
international dispute, especially when based on an Internet case.  For example, in National 
Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp. (iCraveTV.com), a Canadian corporation that offered 
pirated TV programs over the Internet was sued for copyright infringement by a U.S. plaintiff 
hoping to utilize U.S. laws in the litigation.  Personal jurisdiction over the Defendant was 
accomplished by serving the Defendant’s sales manager who happened to reside and work for 
the corporation in Pennsylvania.  Natl. Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp. 
(iCraveTV.com), 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831, 1834 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 66 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42.  See also Perkins, 
342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783. 
 67 See Perkins, 342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros, 465 U.S. 783. 
 68 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (holding that personal 
jurisdiction may be properly asserted over a defendant solely on the basis of service of process 
while a defendant is temporarily physically present in the forum state).  See also 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28.       
 69 See Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421. 
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be found, and that the “continuous and systematic activities” test is therefore 
insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.
70
   
Other nations also differ greatly from the U.S. on the subject of “transitory 
presence” or “tag service.”  This form of service renders a foreign defendant subject 
to litigation in any U.S. jurisdiction so long as the defendant is properly served with 
process in the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff seeks a remedy.
71
  Though the U.S. 
recognizes “tag service” as appropriate, the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters provided a forum for 
nations like Ireland and the U.K. to disagree, voicing their refusal to recognize the 
transitory presence of a defendant within a jurisdiction as a basis for asserting 
personal jurisdiction.
72
  There is a concern amongst those nations that “transient” 
jurisdiction violates customary international law, so U.S. courts have made some 
efforts to comply with those broadly accepted standards,
73
 albeit inconsistently. 
2.  Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
For a U.S. court to assert specific personal jurisdiction in an international case, 
due process necessitates that the foreign defendant “purposefully availed” himself of 
the laws and protections of the U.S., that the defendant’s contacts with the state gave 
rise to the litigation, and that forcing the defendant to litigate in the U.S. is 
objectively reasonable.
74
  The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of this 
                                                          
 70 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  See infra 
pp. 11-12.  In Asahi, the Supreme Court of California held that due process requires that a 
“substantial connection” be made between the defendant and the forum State which satisfies 
minimum contacts, and this must come about “by an action of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.”  Id. at 104.  Therefore, mere placement of a product in the 
stream of commerce is insufficient to meet minimum contacts.  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court, 
though it ultimately reversed the order of the Superior Court of California, agreed that due 
process requires a substantial connection between the defendant and the forum state.  See id. at 
112.  However, it further clarified this standard, holding that “the substantial connection . . . 
between the defendant and the forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must 
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state” 
(emphasis by the Court).  Id.  
U.S. federal courts in international disputes face the issue of whether to apply a “national 
contacts” test or a “state contacts” test.  See generally 2 E-COMMERCE LAW AND BUSINESS 
(Mark E Plotkin, Bert Wells, and Kurt Wimmer eds., 2003). Though federal courts are limited 
by the Fifth Amendment in their exercise of personal jurisdiction, federal statues will often 
incorporate language allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based 
on the defendant’s contacts with the U.S. as a whole, and not simply within one state in the 
U.S. (where it otherwise may not have been allowed to assert jurisdiction because of 
insufficient contacts within that single district).  Id. 
 71  Fisher, Brown & Co. vs. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 104 (1895). 
 72  Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, art. 3, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 8 I.L.M. 229, 232 (1969), as 
amended by 1990 O.J. (L 189) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990), reprinted in 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 
[hereinafter Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction]. 
 73 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 876 n.207 (1997). 
 74 See generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286. 
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reasonableness standard in its decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court.
75
  Asahi, a Japanese corporation, manufactured tire valve assemblies and sold 
the assemblies to Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation that manufactured tire 
tubes.
76
  Approximately twenty percent of the Cheng Shin tire tubes sold in the U.S. 
were available in California, but following a fatal accident in that State that was 
attributed to alleged defects in the tire tubes, a products liability action was initiated 
against Asahi.  Asahi argued that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts within 
the State for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Company, and the Supreme 
Courted held: 
The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a state court's 
assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant will differ from case to 
case. In every case, however, those interests, as well as the Federal 
Government's interest in its foreign relations policies, will be best served 
by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction 
in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on 
an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the 
plaintiff or the forum State.
77
 
The Court found that because Asahi did not purposefully avail itself of activities 
within the State of California, it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the 
State, making personal jurisdiction over the Company impermissible.
78
  
Internationally, there are still concerns as to the appropriateness of specific 
personal jurisdiction under the Asahi guidelines.  Unease often centers on issues of 
convenience, differences in procedural and substantive laws among nations, 
differences in political and social values, and the potential for interference with the 
sovereignty of other states.
79
  Justice Harlan appropriately noted the importance of 
keeping a rational, unselfish perspective of the rights of the U.S. to impose its own 
specialized interests in international disputes.80  He advised in United States v. First 
National City Bank that “[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when 
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”81   
3.  Alternative Means of Asserting Personal Jurisdiction in International Cases 
Though the previous methods of asserting personal jurisdiction often apply in 
state courts, federal courts in the U.S. also have specialized means for establishing 
the right to adjudicate claims against a foreign defendant.  Pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(f), unless there is a federal statute mandating a specific course 
of action, individuals in foreign countries may be served by a U.S. plaintiff where 
                                                          
 75 Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. 
 76 Id. at 106-07. 
 77 Id. at 115. 
 78 Id. at 115-116. 
 79 See BORN, supra note 12, at 78.   
 80 United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 81 Id. 
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there is an internationally agreed upon means for service, reasonably calculated so as 
to give notice to the defendant.
82
  The Rule provides for assertion of personal 
jurisdiction under unique circumstances where jurisdiction over a party concerning a 
federal claim meets due process qualifications but has no basis under federal or state 
law.
83
  The Rule explicitly references the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad 
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents as one of these agreements, which applies 
“in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or 
extrajudicial document for service abroad.”84  Therefore, any of the member states to 
the agreement may assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant through the 
Convention's mechanisms for providing service of process.
85
  On the other hand, 
Rule 4 also states that if there is no international standard, personal jurisdiction may 
be accomplished by serving a foreign defendant according to the laws of that 
nation.
86
  This does not preclude a defendant from challenging the constitutionality 
of a personal jurisdiction claim, but with these methods, there is a greater chance that 
two nations may agree on how personal jurisdiction is to be asserted in an 
international case. 
The federal government also attempts to gain transparency and predictability in 
international arenas by providing personal jurisdiction provisions into federal 
statutes, such as the Clayton Act governing antitrust law.
87
  These are especially 
helpful in adjudicating international cases because the terms supply specific 
provisions allowing for “world-wide” service of process where the defendant 
“transacts business” or anywhere that the defendant “may be found.”88  Not only 
does this aid U.S. courts in justifying assertion of personal jurisdiction in difficult 
scenarios, but it also puts foreign defendants on notice of the circumstances through 
which they may be forced to adjudicate within the U.S.  As a practical matter, 
because statutes like the Clayton Act work in conjunction with Federal Rule 4(k), 
which mandates that exercise of jurisdiction be consistent with the U.S. Constitution, 
a due process analysis is still necessary to determine whether assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant meets with fundamental fairness requirements.89  It is 
                                                          
 82 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(f)(1). 
 83 DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFREY L. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO 
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY § 6.03, at 6-12 (3d ed. 2007).  
 84 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters art. 1, November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 656 U.N.T.S. 163. 
 85 See id. 
 86 FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(f)(2). 
 87 See BORN, supra note 12, at 99-100.  Statutes such as the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §22 
(1982), and the federal securities laws, 15 U.S.C. §§77v, 78aa (1982), allow for “world-wide” 
service of process, while statutes such as RICO, 18 U.S.C. §1965 (1982), only permit “nation-
wide” service of process within the U.S.  Id.   
 88 Id.   
 89 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 4(k)(2)(B).  See also Adam B. Perry, Note, Which Cases are 
“Such Cases”: Interpreting and Applying Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1177, 1188 (2007). 
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generally acknowledged, however, that personal jurisdiction is proper so long as the 
defendant has sufficient aggregate contacts with the U.S. as a whole.90   
Though these guidelines generally assist courts, personal jurisdiction law is still 
controversial when applied internationally.  Ultimately, these statutes and rules fail 
to provide predictability because there is little to no communication on the subject of 
personal jurisdiction with foreign nations, and no set standards for a consistent 
method of jurisdictional procedure.  What further complicates these issues is that 
personal jurisdiction law as we know it is now being imposed upon by a new giant of 
industry: the Internet. 
D.  E-Commerce: Contracting through the Internet  
The explosion of popularity surrounding the use of the Internet is evident in the 
daily lives of most of the world's citizens as well as the economic census data 
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.
91
  A history of the growth in U.S. 
manufacturing shows that e-commerce shipment values practically tripled from 2003 
to 2008, and that the total value of manufactured items sold through e-commerce 
(calculated in millions of dollars) is now almost equal to the dollar amount 
representing items sold through traditional trading methods.
92
  Considering that this 
census data is already two years old as of the date of this paper, it is likely that e-
commerce enterprises have matched, or even exceeded, conventional manufacturing 
and trade transactions. 
As big as e-commerce is in the U.S., international transactions are even greater in 
comparison.  Currently, Western Europe commands the number one spot in retail e-
commerce transactions with online retail sales predicted to exceed $200 billion in 
2012.
93
  The People’s Republic of China (China) is also a contributor, boasting a 22 
percent increase in e-commerce transactions from 2009 to 2010, and yielding 4.5 
trillion yuan ($682.16 billion) in profits.94  Japan, though riding somewhat in the 
wake of most of the world’s retail giants, has also taken advantage of the Internet.95  
Reports maintain that revenues acquired from online sales have increased each year 
by approximately 17 percent since 2005 with expectations of a 10 percent growth 
every year for the next five years.
96
 
Before addressing the effects of e-commerce growth and the complications that 
arise out of its litigation, it is important to understand the different methods of 
Internet contracting.   
                                                          
 90 Perry, supra note 89, at 1218. 
 91 See Annual Survey of Manufactures, and the Economic Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
(2008), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2008/historical/2008ht1.pdf. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Karin von Abrams, Retail E-Commerce in Western Europe, EMARKETER (May, 
2010), http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Emarketer_2000679.aspx. 
 94 China's e-commerce transactions exceed 4.5 trillion yuan in 2010, PEOPLE’S DAILY, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90860/7260847.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2011). 
 95 E-commerce Takes Off in Japan: Up and Away, ECONOMIST, http://www. 
economist.com/node/16322651 (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). 
 96 Id. 
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1.  Types of E-Commerce Transactions and the Problems Resulting from Their Use 
There are three main categories of Internet transactions constituting e-commerce: 
those agreements with shrinkwrap terms, those with clickwrap terms, and those with 
browsewrap terms.
97
  Shrinkwrap terms are found were a purchaser orders a product 
that arrives, usually wrapped in plastic, with the seller's contract terms located 
somewhere in the package.
98
  Clickwrap terms require that the buyer click an “I 
agree” button, thereby consenting to the seller's terms, before a sale is completed.99  
Browsewrap terms are the most flexible, providing that a buyer implicitly agrees to 
the terms of use on a seller's website without express consent, simply by utilizing the 
site.
100
   
In considering each form of e-commerce transaction, it quickly becomes evident 
that classic negotiation methods and dispute resolution are not always easily applied 
to Internet contracts.  A popular complaint is that the terms of the contract are 
unconscionable, resulting in a disproportionate amount of bargaining power for the 
seller with very little influence for the buyer.
101
  Unconscionability is arguably more 
widespread in Internet contracts as opposed to traditional form contracts because, 
especially in terms of browsewrap transactions, buyers are not on notice that they are 
automatically subject to arbitration agreements, since it is unnecessary for them to 
                                                          
 97 KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 193 
(6th ed. 2007). 
For each of the following terms, electronic signatures have been found to be a valid and 
enforceable method of agreement to an electronic contract.  This has been recognized in such 
statutes as E-Sign, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN): 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq. (2000) (signed by President Bill Clinton on June 30, 2000, and 
effective Oct. 1, 2000), UETA, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) (approved by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) on July 23, 
1999; as of July 2001, 36 states enacted this Act), and in the EU, by the Directive on a 
Common Framework for Electronic Signatures.  EU: Directive on a Common Framework for 
Electronic Signatures, 1999: Directive 199/93/EC of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
Framework for Electronic Signatures, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:3199 9L0093:en:HTML. 
Additionally the United Nations has approved an approach to e-signatures in the Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures by UNCITRAL.  UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
with Guide to Enactment 2001, UNCITRAL (April, 2002), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/ml-elecsig-e.pdf. 
 98 See id. at 193-94.  These terms will often include a caveat that the buyer’s failure to 
return the item within a specified time period confirms that the buyer agrees to abide by the 
seller's terms of use.  See id.  
 99 See id. 
 100 See id.  These terms often appear on the provider's homepage, but it is unnecessary for a 
user to make any sign of recognition of or agreement with these terms before they are subject 
to them.  See id.  
 101 See generally Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998) (holding an 
arbitration clause as unenforceable as a contract of adhesion where buyers of computers 
alleged breach of contract (among other things) and had to abide by a terms and conditions 
agreement with hardly a response from the manufacturer). 
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explicitly consent to terms.
102
  Courts may also struggle with a “chicken or the egg” 
problem: was it the seller who initiated the contact by offering a product or service 
over the Internet, or was it the buyer who activated the contract by seeking out the 
goods?  
The litigation process is further complicated because U.S. and international 
courts do not have a uniform method of applying personal jurisdiction to e-
commerce disputes.  Two courts within a single U.S. state may even hold differently 
on a similar matter.  For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan held that a website operated by a nonresident, which did not allow users to 
make purchases through the home page, but rather promoted sales by providing links 
to another site, did not provide sufficient contacts with the state for the court to 
assert personal jurisdiction over it.
103
  In contrast, a case decided just the year before 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in which the 
Court held that a nonresident’s website, used to promote sales, did have sufficient 
contacts with residents of the forum state for the Court to assert personal 
jurisdiction.
104
  The difference here is slight, resting on the respective websites’ level 
of interactivity and how each one sold its products.  As a result, contracting parties 
lack foreseeability as to how a conflict might be resolved.  To address this problem, 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania formulated 
a “sliding scale” test, currently adopted by many state courts dealing with e-
commerce dispute resolution. 
2.  The Zippo “Sliding Scale” Test 
The case of Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com involved an Internet domain 
name dispute in which the Plaintiff, having its principal place of business in 
Pennsylvania, made allegations of trademark dilution and infringement against the 
Defendant, a California corporation that operated a Web site.
105
  The legal question 
was whether Pennsylvania's Long-arm Statute could be used to assert personal 
jurisdiction over Zippo DOT Com (the corporation running the Web site) on the 
basis that it sold passwords to approximately 3,000 Pennsylvania residents and 
entered into seven contracts with Internet providers in Pennsylvania over its course 
of operation.
106
  The court found that because the Defendant did more than simply 
advertise its products in Pennsylvania, and because its contacts with the State's 
citizens were not fortuitous since it consciously decided to process those users' 
requests for services, Zippo DOT Com conducted e-commerce constituting 
“purposeful availment” of doing business in Pennsylvania.107  Specific personal 
                                                          
 102 See KNAPP, supra note 97, at 211. 
 103 Siebellink v. Cyclone Airsports, Ltd., No. 1:01-CV-591, 2001 WL 1910560 (W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 27, 2001).   
 104 Sports Authority Michigan, Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich. 
2000). 
 105 Zippo Mfg. Co. V. Zippo DOT Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121. 
 106 Id. at 1126. 
 107 Id. at 1125-27.  See generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (holding that 
the cause of action must not have arisen out of fortuitous circumstances for due process 
considerations to be satisfied). 
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jurisdiction requirements were satisfied in this case, therefore allowing the court to 
assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Web site corporation.
108
   
In coming to this conclusion, Zippo set out what has become known as the 
“sliding scale” test for determining whether personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant is appropriate in an Internet case.
109
  The sliding scale operates as follows: 
(1) personal jurisdiction is likely proper where a provider openly carries out business 
over the Internet while knowingly and repeatedly transferring files; (2) personal 
jurisdiction is probably improper where a provider manages a passive Web site, 
merely posting information that becomes available to foreign users; and (3) personal 
jurisdiction and its appropriateness is within the discretion of the court, depending 
upon the degree to which an interactive Web site engages its users, as well as the 
commercial nature of the transaction taking place through the site.
110
  This test 
provides a framework for analyzing e-commerce cases, the result being a general 
improvement in a party's ability to predict the outcome of its Internet contracting 
dispute.   
3.  Problems with Zippo 
Even with the guidance the “sliding scale” test provides, there remains a level of 
subjectivity in the court's decision that is unsettling.  Forum states within the U.S. 
still have a tremendous amount of discretion in determining whether personal 
jurisdiction is proper, especially in cases involving interactive Web sites.  Zippo 
asked whether “Dot Com's conducting of electronic commerce with Pennsylvania 
residents [constituted] the purposeful availment of doing business in 
Pennsylvania.”111  This “purposeful availment” standard is in turn a very elastic one, 
requiring courts to consider a corporation or individual's intent in operating a Web 
site to determine if that entity wished to do business in the state.
112
  Because sites set 
up for profit-making purposes normally do not discriminate against customers on the 
basis of residence, it is very easy to make a blanket assumption that every site 
operator purposefully avails himself to doing business in every state, so long as that 
availment results in capital gain.   
In cases of international e-commerce transactions, purposeful availment may be 
especially difficult to prove.  Attempts by member states of the European Union and 
the European Free Trade Area to standardize the means to assert personal 
jurisdiction—basing requirements on domicile in the absence of a contractual 
agreement to do otherwise—113 leaves significant room for conflict.  Even with this 
                                                          
 108 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126-27. 
 109 Id. at 1124.  The Zippo Court based this test on the presumption that “the likelihood that 
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature 
and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.”  Id.  
 110 Id.  As is evidenced by this test, the level of interactivity a Web site requires is a crucial 
factor in understanding whether personal jurisdiction is proper over a nonresident defendant. 
 111 Id. at 1125-26. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 72, art. 2.  See also Council 
Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Dec. 22, 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF.  This 
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agreement, some consumers may be able to bring suit in their own nation’s courts 
for breach of contract despite the fact that their country would traditionally not be 
able to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
114
  This applies where the 
defendant directed attention toward the consumer prior to closing the contract,
115
 but, 
once again, determining whether a plaintiff was actually targeted or merely stumbled 
into the defendant’s broad web of advertising is often difficult to calculate.  
It is unfair to subject sellers to this level of awareness and accountability, 
especially in an age where linking information produced on an original home page to 
another wholly unrelated Web site is so popular.  Conversely, operators of many 
passive Web sites will not be held liable for harm done when truly at fault, simply 
because they hold the trump card of claiming lack of calculated engagement.  
Consequently parties to an e-commerce dispute are still left in the dark, struggling to 
determine whether or not these many tests (“minimum contacts,” “sliding scale,” 
“purposeful availment,” etc.) will result in personal jurisdiction being proper.  
E.  Scholarly Suggestions and International Proposals 
Scholars have offered various suggestions for improving personal jurisdiction 
analysis in e-commerce disputes.  A discussion of these admirable attempts at 
clarification demonstrates that these goals are simply too lofty and impractical.    
1.  The “ODR” Approach  
In his article Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce 
Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient and Secure, Fred Galves proposes 
implementing Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) to negotiate Internet contract cases, 
transforming common Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) by making it available 
entirely online.
116
  He argues that ODR would be a cost-saving, efficient method for 
resolving e-commerce disputes, as opposed to traditional litigation and that it would 
be an improvement over ADR because it would offer a more efficient and informal 
environment for settlement.
117
  To make the system applicable internationally, 
Galves proposes using the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the United Nations 
                                                          
second agreement is significant in that it defines the “place of performance” for all EU 
members (with the exception of Denmark) (art. 5(1)(b)), and also states when and where 
consumers may sue a seller. See id.   
A second proposal was made by the EU Brussels Regulation in 1999 in which the assembly 
decided that jurisdiction over passive Internet sites would not be accepted.  Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, COM(1999) 348 final at 16, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0348:FIN:EN:PDF.  The Proposal 
further states that an online consumer in the EU would be able to bring suit against a Web site 
operator regardless of where the site is based or whether the operator has purposefully 
targeted the nation where the consumer is domiciled.  Id. 
 114 See id. art. 13-15. 
 115 See id. art. 13(3)(a). 
 116 Fred Galves, Virtual Justice as Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce Disputes 
More Convenient, Legitimate, Efficient and Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 6-8 
(2009). 
 117 Id. at 7-8. 
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Convention for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) as the applicable arbitration 
law.
118
 
Though desirable, this approach lacks follow-through.  The UCC is not adopted 
uniformly by all states.
119
  Persons operating out of states that have not adopted 
various UCC provisions would likely argue issues of fairness.  From an international 
perspective, one of the most marked problems with using the CISG is that it has not 
been uniformly ratified by all member states, including the UK
120
 which, as 
previously mentioned, makes up a significant percentage of the world’s e-commerce 
transactions.  Furthermore, the CISG has been criticized for its use of vague 
language, such as “fundamental breach” and “reasonable length.”121  
Even if these contentions were immaterial, problems may arise where dispute 
resolution is forced upon a contracting party.  Although ADR is often provided for 
by contract, and although some persons prefer this form of conflict resolution, others 
prefer their day in court.  A system where parties avoid coming face-to-face may be 
disagreeable to those who wish to present evidence in a courtroom instead of 
uploading documents to the Web, or to those who desire to cross-examine witnesses 
in person instead of over the telephone.  The credibility of parties to the dispute or 
witnesses is also much more difficult to evaluate when the case is resolved online.  
In short, ODR does not address some of the most basic needs of parties to 
contemporary contract disputes. 
2.  The ICC E-Commerce Project 
Another suggestion similar to Galves’ ODR approach is offered by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).  Fundamental to this proposal is that 
there should be more industry self-regulation in e-commerce transactions.
122
  To 
                                                          
 118 Id. at 9-10. 
 119 See generally Uniform Commercial Code Locater, CORNELL (Mar. 15, 2004), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html. 
 120 As of 2005, the UK had not ratified the CISG, though Lord Sainsbury, the Under 
Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry in the House of Lords stated, “the 
United Kingdom intends to ratify the convention, subject to the availability of parliamentary 
time. There have been delays in the past for a number of reasons, but we propose to issue a 
consultation document in the course of the next few months to examine the available options.”  
The Hon. Justice James Douglas, Arbitration of the International Sale of Goods Disputes 
under the Vienna Convention (2006), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
douglas.html (paper delivered at the Institute of Arbitrator and Mediators Australia National 
Conference 2006). 
Today, the UK still has not ratified the CISG.  The Hon. Justice James Douglas posits that the 
UK has several fears preventing it from approving the agreement, including “scepticism [sic] 
about the practical effectiveness of the buyer's remedies provided under the convention 
compared to the remedies under English law,” and “that ratification of the convention in the 
United Kingdom might lead to a reduction in the number of international arbitrations coming 
to England.”  Id.  
 121  See Koji Takahashi, Right to Terminate (Avoid) International Sales of Commodities, 
2003 J. BUS. L. 102, 124 (2003). 
 122 See Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Electronic Commerce, Electronic Commerce 
Project (ECP)'s Ad hoc Task Force, June 6, 2001, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
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accomplish this, the ICC asks that consumers involved in an Internet contract dispute 
first “make reasonable attempt[s] to utilize a company’s internal customer 
satisfaction mechanisms” and then proceed to participate in mandatory online 
alternative dispute resolution programs.
123
  Only where these methods fail to 
conclude the dispute does the ICC allow for litigation in court.
124
 
Again, though these methods of resolving conflicts are well intended, it is likely 
that the plan would be ineffective for the same reasons Galves’ proposition fails.  
Additionally, the ICC does not propose the location of litigation following customer 
service measures and arbitration.  Parties to a suit would still be left without a 
settled-upon forum under this method, and it is likely that nations would again have 
to fight each other to claim personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Ultimately, 
these alternative means to dispute resolution are impractical.  
3.  The “Notice and State Sovereignty” Approach  
A final proposal offers the possibility of abrogating personal jurisdiction 
considerations of purposefulness and convenience in favor of a sovereign state 
approach.  A. Benjamin Spencer proposes that the U.S. Constitutional reservation of 
power to the states, in the absence of federal provisions to the contrary, has been lost 
in the realm of personal jurisdiction and must return.
125
  Spencer argues that the 
procedural requirement of notice and the recognition that states have authority to 
adjudicate in matters they deem to be of legitimate interest to them are of the utmost 
importance in determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper.
126
  He finally 
calls for a U.S. Supreme Court decision that reinstates these concerns as paramount 
in a jurisdiction dispute.
127
 
The theory is appealing because it embraces precedent like International Shoe
128
 
while simply shifting courts’ focus to state interest.  Yet, when applied domestically 
and internationally the approach is flawed; it grants extremely broad authority, 
making it nearly impossible to conceive of a situation where a state or nation would 
not find a particular defendant to be within its jurisdiction.  Despite claims that the 
Supreme Court would not have to abrogate precedent to remain consistent, it appears 
it would.  One of the better-known cases deciding issues of personal jurisdiction is 
Asahi Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court of California.
129
  This case makes clear 
                                                          
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2001/jurisdiction_and_applicable 
_law.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2010).   
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 617, 672 (2006). 
 126  See id.  Under state interest analysis, after assuring itself of the sufficiency of notice, a 
court would engage in a similar, unified inquiry, asking whether the state has a legitimate 
interest in the dispute such that the assertion of jurisdiction is not arbitrary and is therefore 
consistent with the due process rights of the defendant.  See id. at 671. 
 127  See id. at 670-71. 
 128  See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
 129  Asahi, 480 U.S. 102. 
118 THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:95 
 
that the burden on the defendant must be taken into consideration in determining 
whether due process considerations are met.
130
  Clearly, if Asahi were considered 
under Spencer's approach, the State of California would be given greater deference, 
its concerns presiding over those of the defendant's.  Because this method would 
very likely result in precedent being overruled, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court 
would embrace this suggestion. 
III.  ARGUMENT 
As the Internet continues to infiltrate other aspects of our daily lives, there must 
be a consistent method for approaching the issues likely to emanate from its 
influence.  The Obama Administration has expressed a willingness to address 
international e-commerce concerns through an advisory panel.
131
  Cameron Kerry, 
Department of Commerce general counsel, and Christopher Schroeder, Assistant 
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy for the United States Department of 
Justice, have stated that The Interagency Subcommittee on Privacy & Internet Policy 
“will develop principles and strategic directions with the goal of fostering consensus 
in legislative, regulatory, and international Internet policy realm.”132   
While these suggestions have all lacked some essential requirement authorized 
by case law and the U.S. Constitution, one method that would satisfy constitutional, 
state, international, and party concerns would be a statutory standard for the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction in e-commerce cases.  This model statute could be 
enacted across the United States and incorporated into its international treaties.  A 
practical method for putting this theory into action is to formulate a federal long-arm 
statute that directly incorporates e-commerce language.  
A.  The Proposed Statute 
The recommended provision is offered in the following terms: 
 
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents 
 
“A court within the United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person who acts, directly or through an agent, to create a cause of action arising from 
the person's: 
a) Transacting any business in a state within the U.S.; 
b) Contracting to supply services or goods in a state within the U.S.; 
c) Purposefully engaging in an e-commerce transaction in a state within 
the U.S.  A person may be found to purposefully engage in an e-
commerce transaction where: 
(1) The Web site is commercial in nature; 
                                                          
 130  See id. at 113.  The Court explained that, “the determination of the reasonableness of 
the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A 
court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the 
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.”  Id. 
 131 Administration Creates E-Commerce Advisory Panel, U.S. LAW WEEK (Nov. 2, 2010), 
79 U.S.L.W. 1556. 
 132 Id.  
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(2) Contacts made by the defendant via the Internet are active in nature rather 
than merely passive; 
(3) A sufficient showing is made that the defendant has had minimum contacts 
with a state within the U.S.; 
(4) The claim against the defendant arises out of such minimum contacts;  
(5) Requiring the defendant to travel to the U.S. to defend an action is 
reasonable under the circumstances and does not offend fundamental 
considerations of due process; 
(d) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in a state within the U.S.” 
B.  Statutory Language and Its Meaning 
Essential to this proposal is an understanding the proposed statute’s terminology.  
The definitions enumerated here might also be incorporated into the Commentary 
accompanying the statute itself.  The following list focuses specifically on the 
language involved in the e-commerce provision of this long-arm statute: 
 
1. “Person” includes an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, and any other type of association.”133 
 
2. “Purposeful engagement” exists where an action involves the person's 
conduct, or is the direct result of the person's conduct, and it is the person's 
objective to engage in that conduct or to cause that result. 
 
3. “Commercial” includes an activity involving the sale or exchange of goods 
and/or services.
134
 
 
4. “Sufficient” means adequate; of such quality, number, force, or value as is 
necessary for a given purpose.
135
  
 
5. “Minimum contacts” include those connections that manifest sufficient 
evidence of activity by a person in a forum state to allow that state to 
adjudicate against them without offending traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.
136
   
 
6. “Active” contacts are those contacts that involve (1) directing electronic 
activity into a state within the U.S., (2) with the intent of engaging in 
business or other interactions within the State, and (3) where that activity 
creates, in a person within the a state within the U.S., a potential cause of 
action cognizable in that state’s courts.137 
 
                                                          
 133 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.381 (2010) (language from the code was adopted to fit 
this provision).  
 134 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (3d pocket ed.1996) (definition of “commerce”). 
 135 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1474 (8th ed. 2005). 
 136 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 137 See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 11 (2011). 
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7. “Passive” contacts are those contacts that result from merely placing 
information on the Internet without the intent of engaging in business or 
other interactions within a state within the U.S.138   
 
Intrinsic in this proposed statute is the understanding that specific, not general 
personal jurisdiction is the standard for requiring a defendant to litigate in a state 
within the U.S.  The language of the statute—“to create a cause of action arising 
from [the defendant’s conduct,]”— limits a court’s ability to assert personal 
jurisdiction, making it proper only where the claim emanates from a defendant’s 
specific, material contact with the forum state.  This measure is implemented to 
protect the due process rights of a defendant who, under general personal jurisdiction 
standards, might be unduly burdened by being required to litigate in a forum state 
with which it had continuous contacts, but of an unsubstantial nature.   
To this end, a distinctive characteristic of this proposed statute is its focus on 
distinguishing “passive” Internet contacts from “active” contacts.  The growing trend 
among courts appears to be that mere maintenance of an Internet site or the posting 
of information on a site is not enough to subject the operator of the site to personal 
jurisdiction,139 but that a defendant “direct[ing] electronic activity into [a] State” with 
intent to actually engage in business or other interactions in that state is sufficient 
evidence to assert personal jurisdiction over him or her.140  In making this proposed 
statute applicable only to contacts that can be characterized as “active,” the 
collective decisions of contemporary courts will be codified. 
C.  Why This Method Should Be Adopted 
It is evident that the U.S. is a leader by example, with such nations as Australia 
already citing its case law.
141
  By codifying language presently used by the judiciary, 
it will hopefully be an easy transition from courthouse to legislature.  This proposed 
statute incorporates language from several current state long-arm statutes and 
principal language from International Shoe
142
 and Zippo,
143
 two of the most 
authoritative cases on personal jurisdiction law in the United States.  It also focuses 
                                                          
 138 Id. at 11-12. 
 139 See, e.g., Shrader, 633 F.3d at 13; Johsnon v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-76 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 140 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (2002). 
 141 An Australian court recognized the significance of the U.S. concept of “world-wide” 
service of process in its decision in Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 
(10 December 2002).  The Court stated in its opinion that: 
If people wish to do business in, or indeed travel to, or live in, or utilise the 
infrastructure of different countries, they can hardly expect to be absolved from 
compliance with the laws of those countries. The fact that publication might occur 
everywhere does not mean that it occurs nowhere. Multiple publication in different 
jurisdictions is certainly no novelty in a federation such as Australia. 
Id. ¶ 186. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See generally Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119. 
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on specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant, eliminating the broad (and often 
burdensome) scope that a general personal jurisdiction analysis brings. 
This proposal is an improvement over other suggestions involving a major 
overhaul of current procedure or stare decisis.  Though it will take time and money, 
the institution of a federal long-arm statute including e-commerce provisions is 
likely a much simpler task than creating an entirely new forum for personal 
jurisdiction dispute resolution.  In short, a proposed statute incorporating e-
commerce bypasses complications existent in suggestions introduced over the last 
quarter of a century while still accounting for their high points: simplicity and the 
consideration of due process. 
Another advantage of instituting this federal long-arm statute is that it appears 
not to conflict with international jurisdictional standards.  Rather, it comports with 
them.  As previously stated, Western Europe and China each have a significant 
impact upon the e-commerce market and, as such, their jurisdictional laws have 
more relevancy here. 
Within the European Union (EU),144 the Regulation Brussels I governs.145  
Addressing both defendants living within other Member States and those living 
outside of the EU, it states that persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued 
in the courts of that Member State.146  Where the matter concerns a contract dispute 
between two entities within the EU, the defendant may be sued in the Member State 
where the place of performance of the obligation was to take place.147  In terms of 
defendants residing outside of the EU, plaintiffs of Member States may assert 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if that defendant has a place of business or 
residence within the Member State.148  Where the foreign defendant has no such 
presence within the Member State, the plaintiff within the EU must apply to his or 
her local court and request that jurisdiction be asserted over the foreign defendant.149  
That court will only grant permission if the plaintiff proves sufficient grounds for 
asserting jurisdiction, much like the U.S.’s minimum contacts test.150  Of course, 
defendants do have a right to challenge jurisdiction similar to those brought in the 
                                                          
 144 EU Member States include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 145 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2001.  This is commonly referred 
to as “Regulation Brussels I.” 
 146 Id. at Section 1, General Jurisdiction, art. 2(1) (“Subject to this Regulation, persons 
domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that 
Member State.”). 
 147 Id. at Section 2, Special Jurisdiction, art. 5(A)(1)(a) (“A person domiciled in a Member 
State may, in another Member State, be sued: 1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts 
for the place of performance of the obligation in question.”). 
 148 Yannis Constantine, Private International Law and the Questions of Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement in Litigation Cases with a Foreign Element, ANTHONY GOLD, http://www. 
anthonygold.co.uk/site/ang_articles/ang_articles_commercial/ang_articles_private_internation
al_law.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).  
 149 See id.  
 150 See id.  
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U.S. in accordance with due process considerations if they deem jurisdiction to be 
inappropriate or burdensome.151 
China’s civil procedure laws are comparable, mandating that “[a] lawsuit 
initiated over a contract dispute shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court in 
the place where the defendant has his or her domicile or where the contract is 
performed.”152  The law also provides that, where a particular jurisdiction within 
China, or even the nation as a whole, has a particular interest in a dispute, specific 
courts within China may claim jurisdiction.153 
Comparing the laws of these collective jurisdictions shows that a federal long-
arm statute authorizing the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
who have established minimum contacts with the U.S. is appropriate in e-commerce 
cases.  The principal concerns of those territories are the sufficiency of the contact 
between parties arising out of the contract, fairness of process, and the interests of 
the home state.  These important issues are addressed with the proposed federal 
long-arm statute. 
                                                          
 151 See id. 
 152 Law of Civil Procedure (P.R.C.) (Adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh 
National People's Congress on April 9, 1991, promulgated by the Order No 44 of the 
President of the P.R.C.), Part One, ch. II, Section 2, art. 24.  See also Part One, ch. II, Section 
2, art. 25:  
The parties to a contract may choose through agreement stipulated in the written 
contract the people's court in the place where the defendant has his or her domicile, 
where the contract is performed, where the contract is signed, where the plaintiff has 
his or her domicile or where the subject matter is located to have jurisdiction over the 
case, however, such an agreement may not violate the provisions of this Law 
regarding jurisdiction by level and exclusive jurisdiction. 
 153 See Part One, ch. II, Section 1, art. 18: “The grassroots people's courts shall have 
jurisdiction as courts of first instance over civil cases, unless otherwise stipulated by this 
Law;”  
Art.19: “The intermediate people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over 
the following civil cases: 
(1). major cases involving foreign interests; 
(2). cases that have major impact on the area under their jurisdiction; 
and 
(3). cases under the jurisdiction of the intermediate people's courts as determined by 
the Supreme People's Court;” 
Art. 20: “The higher people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over civil 
cases that have major impact on the areas under their jurisdiction;” 
Art. 21: “The Supreme People's Court shall have jurisdiction as the court of first instance over 
the following civil cases: 
(1). cases that have major impact on the whole country; and 
(2). cases that the Supreme People's Court deems it should try.” 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Personal jurisdiction law is an inappropriate standard in its current form to 
properly service the needs of the Internet’s users.  Though courts may attempt to 
utilize traditional means of determining the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction, 
the time has come to remove e-commerce disputes from the realm of total discretion 
afforded the courts under customary tests and to create statutory provisions 
adequately equipped to tackle these issues.   
In adopting this statute, courts and parties to a suit will be better able to predict 
the outcome of disputes, and sellers in particular will have clearer notice of the 
requirements necessary to hale them into court in another jurisdiction.  Referring 
back to the hypothetical introduced in the Background portion of this paper (in 
which S, a seller of widgets located in France, contracted electronically with B, a 
buyer in the U.S.), the application of this proposed federal long-arm statute would 
significantly clarify S’s chances in being required to litigate in the U.S.  A U.S. court 
would consider such factors as whether the website through which the transaction 
took place was commercial in nature, whether S specifically advertised its products 
in B’s region or merely advertised a link offering to sell the widgets, and whether 
claim over the defective widgets arose out of the contacts S had with B and the U.S. 
as a whole.  If the evidence proves that S did meet the requirements of the proposed 
statute, a final inquiry will be made as to whether S’s due process rights would be 
infringed if he were required to litigate in B’s forum state.  With consistent 
application, this federal long-arm statute might significantly decrease questions 
about personal jurisdiction for defendants like S.  
Ultimately, adoption of this proposed addition of a federal long-arm statute is a 
practical approach to resolving disputes over personal jurisdiction in the 
international e-commerce realm.  It requires due process considerations, 
incorporation of the “minimum contacts” test and concerns of “fair play and 
substantial justice.”154  With this awareness, personal jurisdiction law may actually 
be applied in a structured and more predictable manner. 
 
                                                          
 154 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310. 
